Public Blockchains as a Means to Resist Information Censorship by Rocco, Gregory
City University of New York (CUNY)
CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Graduate Center
2-2019
Public Blockchains as a Means to Resist
Information Censorship
Gregory Rocco
The Graduate Center, City University of New York
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds
Part of the Digital Humanities Commons
This Thesis is brought to you by CUNY Academic Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects by an
authorized administrator of CUNY Academic Works. For more information, please contact deposit@gc.cuny.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rocco, Gregory, "Public Blockchains as a Means to Resist Information Censorship" (2019). CUNY Academic Works.
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2995
  
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLIC BLOCKCHAINS AS A MEANS TO RESIST  
INFORMATION CENSORSHIP 
 
by 
 
GREGORY ROCCO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York 
 
2019 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2019 
GREGORY ROCCO 
All Rights Reserved 
iii 
Public Blockchains as a Means to Resist Information Censorship 
by 
Gregory Rocco 
 
 
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in 
satisfaction of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts 
 
 
____________________                         _____________________________________________ 
Date                Michael Mandiberg 
          Thesis Advisor 
____________________                         _____________________________________________ 
Date                Elizabeth Macaulay-Lewis 
          Executive Officer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Public Blockchains as a Means to Resist Information Censorship 
by 
Gregory Rocco  
 
Advisor: Michael Mandiberg 
 
The purpose of this research is to demonstrate how public blockchains offer a greater degree of 
censorship resistance over traditional web-based information broadcasting mechanisms, and a 
comparison of existing options. Public blockchains present a means to mitigate censorship from 
nation states through both a broadcasting and data storage mechanism. They are costly to attack 
and difficult to remove from the public due to their distributed and accessible nature. A recent 
incident in China proved the worth of public blockchains by forcing the distribution of a 
censored letter describing harassment by Peking University into an Ethereum transaction by an 
anonymous individual or party. The Chinese government censored the letter on popular 
centralized services such as WeChat, but was unable to censor it once posted to the Ethereum 
blockchain. Through the demonstration of the letter’s presence on Ethereum as well as the act of 
placing it on other public blockchains, this research highlights the importance of how public 
blockchains will continue to be a vessel for the protection of information well into the future.  
v 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................... iv 
 
List of Figures ..................................................................................................................................... vi 
 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
 
2. China’s History of Censorship ....................................................................................................... 3 
 
3. Bitcoin and Blockchain: A History of Subversion ..................................................................... 12 
 
4. Censorship Resistance Through Blockchains ............................................................................. 34 
 
5. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 46 
 
References .......................................................................................................................................... 48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
List of Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1 ............................................................................................................................................... 22 
 
Figure 2 ............................................................................................................................................... 24 
 
Figure 3 ............................................................................................................................................... 35 
 
Figure 4 ............................................................................................................................................... 37 
 
Figure 5 ............................................................................................................................................... 42 
 
Figure 6 ............................................................................................................................................... 44 
 
Figure 7 ............................................................................................................................................... 45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
1. Introduction 
 
The rapid proliferation of consumer technologies in the 21st century provided both an 
advancement in communications and an even greater opportunity to control narratives on a mass 
scale. With social media and information networks came the rise of less information 
asymmetries, but increased information policing. Information policing and control presents a 
public risk, as nation states can throttle and modify information to fit a particular agenda. As the 
internet becomes a universal source of truth for its participants due to the quality of being a mass 
information network, it’s increasingly important to identify how information flows. Nation states 
such as China that typically throttle communications can easily censor centralized services that 
broadcast and host information. A nefarious nation state can censor and modify information for 
malicious means and potentially re-write history to control a populace. Public blockchains 
present a greater way to mitigate censorship from a nation state while broadcasting information 
due to their distribution and costly, narrow attack surface.  
A blockchain is a form of distributed database shared across all participants running its 
software. Each participant has an exact history of the database and can add data to it. The cost of 
adding to the public blockchain is what keeps participants incentivized to keep the system 
running. Public blockchains represent a step above traditional censorship resistance, as there’s a 
financial incentive to protect the included data. A financial asset rewards participants for 
bundling transactions to add to this distributed database, and this financial asset continues to 
increase the cost of attacking the database. As more participants purchase hardware and assets to 
protect particular public blockchains, it only increases the cost for a nation state to do the same in 
order to attack it. A truly ‘decentralized’ public blockchain serves as a public good, in which all 
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participants are free to transact on it, so long as they either run the software or use a third party’s 
implementation via a service.  
Censorship resistance traditionally comes from traditional peer to peer routed browsers 
such as Tor and VPNs (virtual private networks) that mask participants. Tor for example is an 
internet browser that routes participants through relays run by volunteer participants. These 
relays conceal user locations and activity, and the service is only kept alive by those running 
relays. If the relays cease to exist, Tor essentially becomes useless for those that need it. Tor 
relies on volunteers that may not wish to volunteer anymore, as there’s no financial incentive 
powering their provided service other than for a greater good. VPNs act almost like Tor but on a 
commercial server-based scale. Users are typically routed through connections in locations of 
their choosing to access locally blocked services. The problem with VPNs is that they’re a 
commercial service and potentially blocked from operating in particular locations. For example, 
approved VPN services exist in China, but this simply allows the government to comb the logs 
of the services. If the Chinese government demanded VPN logs from users, it would receive 
them and figure out where their users are browsing. If a service is non-compliant and allows 
users to evade Chinese restrictions, they can easily be shut down. Tor provides a narrower attack 
surface in this case by being run by volunteers worldwide.  
 In the case of information longevity, Tor and VPNs aren’t hosting data, but merely acting 
as a means to access it through browsing. Configured servers can in fact receive connections 
through Tor to mask themselves (the deep web), but these servers are typically centralized and if 
ever taken down, the information goes with it. In the case of public blockchains, any information 
written in the form of a transaction is immediately relayed to all participants hosting a copy of 
the network. It was as if a tor-configured server had thousands of copies (in the case of some 
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public blockchains) that continually hosted the information. Even if one participant went down, 
the information still lives in that distributed database.  
 China presents a very public example of a nation state with a history of censoring 
information from its people (Lorentzen, 2014). Although individuals under the regime have used 
plenty of services to attempt to mitigate censorship, public blockchains offer an alternative 
means to host sensitive information. The information hosted on a public blockchain isn’t 
completely immutable but presents a step far above traditional centralized services through both 
a financial asset and redundancy. Recently, a case of information surfacing on a sensitive issue in 
China’s Peking University caused the government to respond swiftly to take it down from all 
centralized services. What they weren’t expecting was an effort to keep the information public 
by placing it on a public blockchain. In order understand China’s reactionary censorship policies, 
it’s important to understand both their history of censorship and current methods at their disposal 
today.  
2. China’s History of Censorship  
 
 The association of China with censorship has become commonplace, as their practices 
from the print age to the digital age have reflected that sentiment. One pervasive narrative has 
attributed China’s strict censorship enforcement with its desire to maintain political control 
through the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Lorentzen, 2014). The idea of a free press is 
critical to democracy, as information can flow freely to enable citizens to make informed 
decisions about political issues. A restrictive press can ensure curated information and depict a 
controlled narrative. As all legally viewable media in China must be subject to the control of the 
CCP, so too must be those that are reporting on the media as well (Lorentzen, 2014). In this case, 
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the internet for communications has served as a new point of control where any individual can be 
a “reporter” in a public setting. The government had to figure out how to extend this control to 
the web, as self-publishing and communications took on a different meaning aside from the 
traditional one-way relay of information that legacy systems provided. The government’s 
authority determines which individuals can receive a form of sponsorship to relay media.  
 The internet has been around since the 1990s in China, and the number of individuals 
with access to it has been rapidly expanding since then. A recent data release from China’s 
Internet Network Information center found that 802 million individuals in China were actively 
using the internet, with 98% of that portion being mobile users (McCarty, 2018). That is 10% 
higher from figures in 2012 that found 40% of the population to be using the internet (Tkacheva, 
2012). The mobile boom that began back in the late 2000s solidified it in the early 2010s, with 
many Asian markets beginning to manufacture affordable devices. The censorship surface 
increases with the increase in active users through the use of large bottlenecks. However, China 
predicted this massive influx of internet usage through the beginnings of its massive network 
policing program which began to form in the early 2000s.  
The way China manages its grip on the country’s internet is through a mechanism known 
as The Great Firewall (GFW) which serves as a base filter for all activities (Dowell, 2006). What 
originally began as an invention of the west to filter out adult content became weaponized by the 
state in an attempt to filter all types of content. The GFW originally started as “The Golden 
Shield” project in 2000, which was an effort to have a database of all citizen-based records 
connected to national security agencies (Ramli, 2017). After becoming a robust filtering system, 
it is now maintained and enforced by an organization consisting of thousands of employees, 
along with enforcement through social influence. Chinese technology companies have only 
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furthered the normalization of censorship through their own self-policing and restrictions in 
order to appeal to the state.  
In 2007, a group from The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University 
put together a landscape report on censorship circumvention methods for internet users. The 
study evaluated the tools based on six criteria including utility, usability, security, promotion and 
marketing, fiscal sustainability, and openness (Roberts, 5). As the filtering and censorship of 
content became more pervasive by nation states such as China, the report assessed the usability 
of tools for basic users to help navigate the web with a degree of freedom. However, the study 
found that many of the flawed tools slow down access to the internet due to the fact that they act 
as layers underneath base connections. Unfortunately, this will continue to be the case, even with 
blockchains until they scale, as they’re quite slow. However, their financial incentive built in 
makes them costly to censor.  
Curated lists of filtered sites began appearing more as the censorship of the web became 
more prominent. Once such initiative is the Heredict Project, which collects crowdsourced 
information on any forms of censorship or blocking. The project was originally from Harvard 
University and has been providing granular data that’s filterable by country and often censored 
sites. The OpenNet Initiative is a project of a similar nature but conducts wider research reports 
on the entire web based on country rather than provide datasets. The OpenNet Initiative has 
China ranked “low” in terms of net transparency with a high degree of both political and 
conflict-based censorship on their internet (OpenNet Initiative, 2012). 
China’s internet system acts through layered forms of filtering from the base connection, 
to the many services that exist in the country. Their “just-in-time” filtering takes shape first 
through the form of keywords (OpenNet Initiative, 2012). The Chinese government will begin by 
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cutting access to content that contains particular keywords, which will then trigger individual 
services such as blogs and other commercial websites to begin to self-police (Dan, 2010). As the 
smaller services begin to self-police and the filtering continues to become abstracted, the actual 
censorship becomes stricter due to services wishing to catch any offenses before they become 
escalated to the Chinese government. This forms a panopticon in which services and even 
individuals continuously self-police in order to catch ‘bad behavior’. 
In the case of China, the removal of services is frequent as they are at the mercy of the 
Government. Rather than needing to attack a particular entity from a technical approach (as 
every service provider is state sponsored) the state can simply put in a request to censor content 
or block the actual provider. If China’s censored version of Google didn’t comply with the state 
sponsored program, China could simply filter out the service from their internet. There is no 
massive overhead cost of carrying out a cyber attack as the attack is regulatory-based. Because of 
the strict requirements of becoming a service provider in China, most firms will comply with the 
existing rules in order to capture the potential business. If the Chinese government wished to 
deny a particular service outside of their jurisdiction, that would require resources beyond 
absolute political and social influence in the country.  
 Removed services in western democracies do not equate to censorship on a nation-state 
level. For example, social media companies in the United States have been complying with the 
government for the sake of criminal investigations which require the release of data, and have 
been self-policing in terms of removing content (Jacobson, 2017). Although the United States 
government has taken a hands-off approach in terms of filtering content, private companies still 
attempt to thwart any involvement. Private hosting providers have also begun to remove 
particular sites from their services as they may not comply with their ethics (Romm, 2018). 
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However, removal at a private level isn’t censorship at a nation-state level, and the parties 
seeking hosting can simply move to another provider. It wasn’t an order from the federal 
government that removed the party seeking hosting services, rather, private entities were the 
perpetrator. This differentiated the cases from that of China’s.  
Censorship begins at the search engine level, as search engines serve as a major entry 
point for those browsing the web. A study conducted by David Bamman in 2012 demonstrated 
that even “soft censorship” existed in the context of search engines, as the engines even began 
blocking political dissidents in the country at the time (Bamman, 2012). The censorship of 
restricted terms and events was blatantly constructed by the government, but they’ve even 
deployed pervasive methods that aren’t as easily seen by the average browser. Also included in 
these soft forms of censors are individuals associated with both the Falun Gong movement which 
was a silenced philosophical movement in the late 1990s, and western media figures outside of 
the country.  
There is in fact a degree of complicity with larger western companies as well. For 
example, Google recently had a confidential plan leaked to create a censored version of their 
search engine in China, nicknamed “dragonfly” (Gallagher, 2018). Even back in 2004, a 
subsidiary of Yahoo willingly provided the Chinese government with the email records of Shi 
Tao, an individual that emailed out a government warning on witnesses of the Tiananmen 
massacres being “destabilizing,” which led to her eventual arrest in 2004 (Dowell, 2006). This 
was part of the subsidiary’s signing of a compliance law back in 2002, where it vowed to give up 
information if necessary to the government. The problem from a business perspective of ignoring 
these markets comes from the billions of potential customers that can utilize services effectively. 
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However, the other edge of the blade deals with complying with a nation state that thrives on 
censorship.  
The study also found that the censorship of terms was a regional occurrence as well, with 
different regions providing different terms and levels of censorship. While observing geographic 
trends provided by users adding metadata to their Sina Weibo accounts, it was found that the 
majority of censored messages originated from Tibet, Qinghai, and Ningxia (Bamman, 2012). 
Along with increased censoring across particular regions, Tibetan users alone suffered from over 
half of their messages being deleted (Bamman, 2012). Higher amounts of unrest in a region 
typically correlated with heavier censorship, as the government may find it valuable to keep 
areas under control through forms of filtering.  
Besides traditional search engines, microblogging services are also popular in China and 
are quite heavily policed. One of China’s most famous iterations, Sina Weibo, has been known to 
have intense moderation of user content and the banning of accounts if they don’t fall in line 
with the regulation of the service. In the case of New York Times reporter Nick Kristof, the 
service removed images he posted on Weibo of Tiananmen Square within twenty minutes after 
posting. This was due to the fact that the images did not adhere to the moderation guidelines, and 
depicted a political protest (Kristof, 2011). Along with content moderation, the microblogging 
service also deploys automated forms of censorship that prevent users from using any 
government-blacklisted keywords (Larmer, 2011). This in turn acts as a secondary catch-layer 
below the moderation level. If the human moderators are unable to find and detect all forms of 
censorable content, the second layer acts as an extra blocker in the service.  
 China has been quite successful in regard to creating technological choke-points like 
microblogging services, search engines, and messaging applications. By definition, a 
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technological choke-point is something that offers convenience to its users but has them pay in 
various forms of autonomy. Shackling certain services to the benefit of others - for example, 
censoring some websites but creating an excellent user experience for the rest of the internet, 
makes policing a state quite simple. WeChat is a great example of this, as its provided services 
have stretched far beyond its original intent. It takes the approach of an “apps within an app” 
model where all services become hooked to the base layer application (Chan, 2015). By doing 
this, an application is first introduced as a convenience, but grows into an apparatus for the state 
by providing services on top of the base layer that are also controlled and monitored. This could 
also allow the nation state to surveil individuals in other countries if the released application 
operates in other nations.   
WeChat was originally founded in 2011 and owned by Tencent, one of China’s massive 
technology conglomerates that has successful properties across multiple verticals. Before 
WeChat came around, China’s popular social media service was Weibo, the aforementioned 
microblogging service (Chan, 2015). WeChat’s vision was to allow brands to offer a greater 
experience than simply broadcasting by introducing an interactive layer in the form of 
personalized experiences and targeting. Many of the tools coupled with the interactive layer 
involved user targeting to send specific messages to specific demographics that follow a brand or 
individual, in order to capture both personal and enterprise markets. Through its ease of use as a 
messaging application, and continued application support, WeChat has amassed nearly a billion 
users in its short lifespan of less than ten years (Liao, 2018). China also keeps its stranglehold on 
the application by banning American applications that offer the same functionality, effectively 
creating a state-based monopoly on communication mediums.  
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 WeChat has expanded even toward a state-level crossover into physical space with the 
integration of their virtual identity system. As of 2017, the application began rolling out its 
network ID card program that’s integrated directly in the application. The network identity card 
grants access to government affairs, accommodations, tickets, and other services in place of a 
normally issued government identity (Xinhua, 2017). At this point, the application has expanded 
well beyond the means of basic communications, and into a web browser, payments processing, 
and even government issued identities. As features continually roll out, the price of convenience 
is a ruse to make it harder for individuals to opt out of the system. WeChat essentially becomes 
the panoptical eyes for the government to continue policing the state through the lens of a 
lifestyle application. It also plays a larger role in modern social interactions in China, and 
became a cesspool for censorship during the height of the ‘Me Too’ movement, which became a 
rallying cry and empowerment movement for women who had been sexually assaulted.  
 The ‘Me Too’ movement originally began in 2006 with Tarana Burke’s call to arms to 
empower women and girls of color who’ve experienced sexual assault (Ohlheiser, 2017). It 
began as a MySpace page for the movement which became the first rallying cry. Almost eleven 
years later, American actress Alyssa Milano revived the social media presence of the phrase at 
the same time of the Harvey Weinstein scandal. In less than 24 hours of Milano’s post, the ‘Me 
Too’ discussion was present in more than 12 million posts on Facebook alone (Santiago, 2017). 
The movement spanned multiple verticals, and eventually led to an international presence where 
young women across the world continued the movement’s vision for transparency and 
empowerment. The movement even made its way to Peking University in China, where an 
individual by the name of Gao Yan took her life over two decades ago due to a sexual assault 
case.  
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In 1998, Gao Yan, a student at Peking University, was sexually assaulted by her 
professor and shortly killed herself thereafter (Hernandez, 2018). According to a recent article by 
a friend of Yan’s, Li Youyou, Yan was put in the spotlight because Yang told other students that 
Yan seduced him (Feng, 2018). This then tarnished Yan’s reputation which led to her eventual 
suicide. The professor, Shen Yang, was a literature professor and apparently had multiple 
students besides Yan that he had sexual relationships with, and continued defending himself even 
after Yan’s death. Evidence has also recently been emerging as well, including accounts from 
students close to Yan at the time of her suicide, and recent victims of Shen’s behavior. As the 
‘Me Too’ movement made its way to China, Yan’s case came back to the public spotlight in full 
force, along with students wishing to seek action on Shen in regard to what happened back in 
1998.  
 Yue Xin was a student activist at Peking University where the events surrounding Gao 
Yan’s suicide took place. She and a group of eight other student activists submitted a freedom of 
information request in regard to the school’s official records on the case of Gao Yan. Xin’s letter, 
now on-chain, gave her account of the harassment she faced from Peking University after filing 
the request. After Xin’s freedom of information request, the university’s Office of Student 
Affairs turned toward interrogation techniques to coerce Xin to drop the request. After 
threatening her with potentially not graduating, and attempting to get her family involved, the 
situation escalated which involved the school’s authorities. Just two weeks later on April 22nd, 
Xin’s advisor went into her dormitory at one in the morning to demand the deletion of all the 
data related to the request, and that she appear before the Office of Student Affairs to confirm its 
removal. With the inclusion of her family in the matter, the authorities at the university 
apparently pressured Xin’s mother so hard that she potentially considered suicide (Feng, 2018).  
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 After going over the events of the two weeks that followed the request for information, 
Xin listed out a formal appeal to the School of Foreign Languages at Peking in order to confirm 
these events to prevent their erasure. Her first demand was that the university issue a written 
explanation justifying their actions against Xin. Her second and third involved the ending of the 
pressuring of her family, along with a written confirmation that none of the events would affect 
her graduation. Her last two demands were that the school hold themselves accountable for any 
mental or fiscal damage this causes Xin now or in her future, and that the school should publish a 
response to the appeal (Xin, 2018). After the letter’s publishing, it circulated widely and banter 
began to reach the internet as well. Students placed posters on the walls of the university in 
support of Xin’s efforts and against the efforts of the university to censor her.1  
 Because the university wished to save-face, they removed the letter from any medium 
they could. The Chinese government has excessive powers when it comes to censorship, so any 
piece of content they wish to hide from their subjects is typically taken down immediately. As 
soon as the letter began to circulate, it appeared on both WeChat and Weibo (Liao, 2018). After 
circulating for a short period of time on the applications, the government quickly took the posts 
down to prevent other individuals from actively viewing it (Zhai, 2018). What the government 
didn’t expect after that was an anonymous individual posting the letter itself to a blockchain in a 
transaction.  
3. Bitcoin and Blockchain: A History of Subversion 
 
The first iteration of a blockchain came with bitcoin’s creation. Typically most academic 
works and mainstream conversations involving bitcoin include price speculation and frameworks 
                                               
1  Zhang, Shawn (shawnwzhang). "Posters show up on Peking university campus to support #metoo activist Yue 
Xin. https://t.co/YsUE9ygiZs". 23 Apr 2018, 14:53 UTC. Tweet 
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for evaluating its potential future value. However, bitcoin and its blockchain is not simply a 
speculative instrument, but a decentralized revolution in which a monetary supply and data is 
global, transferrable, and immutable for the first time. There is no need to trust any centralized 
party, as the open-source code can invalidate all concerns. Parties can transact value in a direct 
fashion, and nodes distributed across the globe validate transactions. However, transactional 
value comes in various different forms besides currency - it could also come in the form of 
information. Information has just as much value as monetary currency, and the value not only 
comes through its transmission, but its resistance to outside actors.   
One of bitcoin’s key attributes is that it is censorship resistant both from an accessibility 
and alteration standpoint. From accessibility, anyone that can load bitcoin’s software or a run a 
bitcoin wallet can transact on the network. Since there is no centralized validating party ensuring 
everyone is following the rules, there is no discrimination as to who can send value and how 
much one can send. On the topic of alteration, bitcoin is extremely difficult to tamper with and 
the costs greatly outweigh the benefits of attacking the network. The system began with 
Nakamoto’s white paper released in 2008, which drew from a vast array of technical and 
philosophical concepts.  
The white paper began by defining the problems with centralized institutions, namely 
financial ones that are in the center of all digital transactions between two parties (Nakamoto, 1). 
The cause for concern with centralized financial institutions falls under the power that they 
possess to both increase the costs of transacting, and potentially reversing or censoring 
transactions. At this point, internet-based commerce was growing rapidly, and so too was the 
reliance on these institutions. The only way to effectively dissolve this reliance was through the 
use of pure fiat currency, but unfortunately no system existed to facilitate digital payments as 
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trustlessly as cash can (Nakamoto 1). The ability to solve this in Nakamoto’s system came as an 
impractical double-spend which involved properly incentivizing those that provided hashpower, 
or work in the form of energy spent, to the network. A double spend is a situation in which two 
unique transactions contain a copy of the same digital value (Chaum, 98). For instance, a cash 
transaction could involve the physical movement of a twenty dollar bill, but a digital transaction 
is simply a number in a database. Copying this number is a possibility if a central party does not 
moderate the transaction. In a digital monetary system, it would be very dangerous for an 
individual to spend the same value twice. Double spending in a decentralized or centralized 
system introduces a distrust of money in being both secure, and sure in its supply schedule.  
 Bitcoin’s protocol involves a blockchain, or simply, a chain of blocks that contain 
transactions that contain data. The system acts as a distributed, append-only database. Rather 
than one central party control the ledger of transactions, all parties that wish to run a node on the 
network verify transactions, and the entire chain, or ledger, updates accordingly. Each block 
contains a hash, or a cryptographic reference of the previous block, a new nonce (or an arbitrary 
number), and transactions. Nodes broadcast and validate new transactions, and miners add 
validated transactions into blocks. Miners are simply pointing computing power toward the 
network through what’s called a “proof of work” process to find the nonce of a new block 
(Nakamoto 3). Once the miner finds the proof of work, they can then add the block. Once the 
miner “mines” the block, nodes add it to their shared histories.  
Proof of work was originally proposed as a way to prevent junk mail and provide access 
controls to shared resources (Dwork, 1). What it required was a small amount of computation 
from a particular sender in order to send a transaction (in this case email), to prevent spam 
attacks. Requiring that computation would add a cost, or pricing function, to add a form of 
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difficulty to an attack (Dwork, 2). In 1997, Adam Back took this original concept and proposed 
his own version called Hashcash. Hashcash took this original proposal, and modified it to have 
emails include a hashcash stamp to headers in order to prove the existence of expended energy in 
order to send the email (Back, 1997). This then provided the incentive for spammers not to send 
emails, as it prevents malicious miners from over-representing themselves on the bitcoin network 
(Nakamoto, 3).  
Close to Nakamoto’s final implementation was cryptographer Hal Finney’s Reusable 
Proof of Work (RPOW) system in which proof of work was required for the signing of moving 
digital tokens (Finney, 2004). Although the model was dependent on central servers, or 
specifically the IBM 4758 processor for security at the time, it was a way in which a foundation 
was put down for a digital payments system built on prior models. The implementation 
referenced an updated version of Back’s vision of Hashcash in which the reuse of email tokens 
could prevent heavy costs. Outgoing messages could rehash the tokens generated in the RPOW 
system from incoming messages. This was a step closer to bitcoin’s model.   
Bitcoin, the cryptocurrency, is the monetary value transacted on the chain. Bitcoin isn’t a 
physical coin or digital “coin” per se, but the right to a specific value. A chain of digital 
signatures represents this specific value (Nakamoto, 2). In this case, value is simply tracked 
throughout the chain on a who-gave-who basis - for this example, let’s assume the presence of 
three fictional individuals that all wish to transact: Alice, Bob, and Jim. If Alice paid Bob three 
bitcoin, she must first sign off on the transaction, and according to the ledger, Bob is now the 
owner of those three bitcoin. If Bob were to transact with Jim and send him those three bitcoin, 
the ownership is now tracked from Jim to Bob to Alice, and from wherever Alice received those 
bitcoin from. This is all handled with Nakamoto’s unspent transaction output model.  
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In this model, combined inputs make a single output, rather than transactions just having 
an input and an output. This is in order to maintain bitcoin’s accounting system, and combine 
values from previous inputs to achieve the desired output amount. To explain this scenario, Jim 
has received a single bitcoin from Alice and a half a bitcoin from Bob. If Jim wishes to send one 
and a quarter bitcoin to Joe, he would be sending both the input from Bob and the input from 
Alice, consisting of one and a half bitcoin, and would receive a quarter bitcoin back to his wallet. 
This would be the case of multiple inputs combining to make two outputs: the bitcoin sent to Joe, 
and the change Jim receives back (Nakamoto, 5).  
 The unique incentive that Nakamoto added to the system was that of a block reward for 
the miners. This is the way bitcoin is initially distributed by the network, as there were not 
wallets that simply started with bitcoin inside of them. If a miner were to successfully find the 
proof of work and add the next block to the chain, the reward would be in the form of bitcoin. 
The initial rewards for finding blocks were large, but with an assumed influx of new participants 
and hashpower over time, the rewards schedule is set to decrease on a particular interval along 
with the difficulty of finding a block increasing. This keeps both the system in balance and the 
miners incentivized to keep adding hashpower to the network in order to secure it. Once the 
block rewards end and the twenty-one million supply has been reached, transaction fees are left 
to incentivize the miners. It is bitcoin’s supply schedule and security that gives it the property of 
sound money.  
The other incentive in the system is for node operators that aren’t necessarily adding 
hashpower to the network, but rather keeping a copy of the blockchain locally on their machines. 
This first and foremost allows the individual to verify that the blockchain is accepting and 
rejecting transactions as designed. There is also no need in this case to broadcast transactions 
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through a third party operator, as you’re both submitting your transactions and verifying them 
directly. This also allows the individual operating the node to remain private - one of the key 
features of bitcoin’s network in terms of both fungibility and censorship resistance. Fungibility is 
the value interchangeability of a good, with cash being a great example. If Bob hands Alice a 
twenty dollar bill in exchange for a different twenty dollar bill, that’s fine because the cash is 
fungible. If Bob lends Alice his truck and she returns with a new model of the same exact truck, 
it has a completely different value and is therefore not fungible. Fungibility in this case is the 
interchangeability of bitcoin which is linked to its traceability.  
To further breakdown the existing technologies deployed in this protocol, the first part of 
the system’s data structure was similar to that of a linked-list. The linked list structure, originally 
invented by Allen Newell, Cliff Shaw, and Harbert A. Simon called for a similar chain of data 
based items, but in the case of the linked list, references were pointers rather than parent hashes 
(Dalal, 1282). The genesis block containing the first transaction is the first in the sequence of 
parent hashes. Linked lists also present the problem of malleability, where the list can have data 
removed or appended. This issue isn’t present in the case of a properly operating blockchain. 
 Another way in which blockchains differ from linked lists is in their usage of merkle 
trees to store transactions (Nakamoto, 4). This was a measure put into place for the sake of 
storage because of the buildup of various transactions within each block. Merkle Trees are 
hashed transactions within each block, with the root being the main component of the block. The 
merkle tree in this case is a digital fingerprint of a transaction, representing the whole, but easily 
verifiable. The combination of its decentralized consensus, parent hashes, and merkle trees 
separated it enough to add linked lists simply as a form of borrowed technology, much like the 
entire bitcoin protocol. Nakamoto’s achievement was in the form of incentive structures to reach 
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a decentralized consensus where no central actor is moving the system forward alone. They 
couldn’t of accomplished this feat had it not been for the technology that came before it, like 
public key cryptography.  
  Bitcoin the cryptocurrency isn’t a system of storing actual coins, but rather an audit trail 
of digital signatures that signifies value (Nakamoto, 2). Bitcoin’s address system uses public key 
cryptography, which was originally created by Ralph Merkle on the heels of Whitfield Diffie and 
Martin Hellman’s work. This is where both the “public key” and “private key” serve as the 
wallet address and right to sign off on balances respectively. The public key is a derivative of the 
private key, and serves as ownership proof of value on the network itself. The private key is to 
simply sign off on transactions and allow the transfer of value to another participant’s holdings. 
The public key is one’s wallet, or a target where to send value, and the private key acts more as a 
password to prove ownership of what’s contained in a wallet.  
 However, aside from borrowing technology, the concept of bitcoin wasn’t new. It was 
born through a canon of works produced by early cryptographers and cypherpunks, as well as 
other attempts at creating digital currencies as the computing age took hold of the world. The 
origin of the philosophy came out of a movement from the late 80s that took David Chaum’s 
work on subverting governments into an underground collective known as the cypherpunks 
(Narayanan, 2). In 1988, one of the movement’s founders and Intel employee, Tim May, brought 
together the philosophy in a work known as the Crypto-Anarchist Manifesto that set the 
framework for the continuation of cryptography for the sake of subversion and individual liberty. 
But it wasn’t until 1992 that the group turned into a formalized email list. 
In the manifesto, May positions crypto anarchy as a movement not only in which 
anonymity is central, but government regulations are ‘altered completely’ in the form of 
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information control, taxation, and trust (May, 1988). The technologies realized up until this point 
including public-key cryptography which allowed for identity anonymity, zero-knowledge proof 
systems for transacting anonymously, and authentication and verification methods, set the stage 
for a “revolution” as he put it. However, one of the more important items to note was the way in 
which he framed the State’s pushback on the movement. This, according to May, would come in 
the form of scare tactics where this kind of movement is simply for drug dealers and tax evaders 
- similar to the way in which the state viewed bitcoin from the very beginning (May, 1988). 
Crypto-Anarchy would be a way in which any transaction - whether it be of value, “words, or 
pictures,” would have a liquid market in which it could thrive.   
From this work came The Cyphernomicon, which was a follow-up created by May to 
both address the progress made by the Cypherpunks and to provide its mailing list with an FAQ 
filled with notes on crypto-anarchism and privacy (May, 1994a). Within that text came a 
summary of the goals and missions of the Cypherpunks created by Eric Hughes that was sent to 
each new member:  
 
"Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there 
   were more of it.  Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want 
   privacy must create it for themselves and not expect 
   governments, corporations, or other large, faceless 
   organizations to grant them privacy out of beneficence. 
   Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their own 
   privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors, 
   and couriers.  Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other 
   people from speaking about their experiences or their 
   Opinions.” (May, 1994a). 
 
It was clear that resisting censorship from tyrannical governments was one of the main goals, as 
privacy and cryptography ensure both the safety and voice of the participant to be heard. 
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Encryption was not only a tool of privacy, but a lock on the information that was being 
transmitted to prevent tampering. From this ideology also spawned May’s vision of virtual 
communities in which online communities would deploy unbreakable encryption techniques, 
have digital mixes and pseudonyms for communications, and utilize digital cash for commerce 
(May, 1994b). These communities would be free from tyranny, as there would be no limitations 
on speech or transacting.  
One of the more important theoretical works referenced in the original white paper was 
Wei Dai’s b-money which expands on May’s crypto-anarchy. Along with this expansion is a 
framework for a medium of exchange loosely resembling bitcoin. In his work, Dai sees crypto-
anarchy not just a removal of governments, but a world in which they are “permanently 
forbidden and permanently unnecessary” (Dai, 1998).  The violence associated with traditional 
anarchistic communities is “impotent,” as cryptography includes anonymity for participants. 
Dai’s philosophy of b-money comes from the fact that the cooperation of said participants 
requires a form of currency (Dai, 1998). To achieve this, Dai proposed a distributed ledger with 
digital signatures, similar to how bitcoin operates just ten years later. However, in Dai’s system, 
a proposed staking or bond model incentivizes nodes in order to broadcast transactions.   
 As Dai outlines digital money, that doesn’t simply just refer to value, but rather the 
transmission of information as well. In between the creation of the Crypto-Anarchist Manifesto 
and the creation of bitcoin existed two major attempts at actually creating a system of digital 
currency. The first was David Chaum’s Untraceable Electronic Cash in 1990, which was based 
on his paper from 1983 on a system for untraceable payments. In Chaum’s system, A central 
bank system verifies digital currency, but granted participants the ability to not transmit any 
information to vendors (Chaum, 322). The system used a public key cryptography scheme as a 
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way to identify participants and sign off on values. This eventually led to Chaum’s venture, 
DigiCash in the 1990s which deployed the system to a certain extent. The other system was Nick 
Szabo’s Bit Gold in 2005, which was hypothetical, but showed the most similarity to bitcoin. In 
Bit Gold, A “distributed property title registry” contains an attached timestamped proof of work 
function (Szabo, 2005). One could verify ownership of the currency through the “unforgeable” 
chain, with Finney’s RPOW scheme referenced. Bit Gold was another great attempt at money 
with security from counterfeit copying and theft (Szabo, 2005).  
 After the combination of these technologies and philosophical materials, Nakamoto 
launched the genesis block of bitcoin in January of 2009, just two months after the first email 
was sent describing the system. It was only one month before that Nakamoto started the bitcoin 
mailing list. The genesis block was quite simple as a  transaction - mining the block to the 
address known now as the “genesis address” granted fifty bitcoin. Seven days later, Nakamoto 
released the first email for the list detailing how to set up a node, the system’s inflation rate, and 
how to send money, as well as one key detail: “it’s completely decentralized with no server or 
central authority” (Nakamoto, 2009). However, what Nakamoto left in the genesis block will 
continually represent the day that the revolution started.   
Encoded in the genesis block (figure 1) was a distinct message left in the coinbase 
transaction, which is the transaction that pays out a block reward. Miners have an input of one 
hundred bytes to place data, and the genesis block included “The Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor 
on the brink of second bailout for banks” as a message. This was a reference to an English 
newspaper headline detailing the fact that the banks needed a second bailout after an initial 
bailout of £37 billion did not clean up their financial crisis (Elliot, 2009). This act of rebellion 
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and encoding by Nakamoto was to forever enshrine the corruption of centralized banking 
systems for all to see, following the financial crisis of 2008.  
The very act of protest and rebellion was not just to create a decentralized currency, but 
to include voices within its operation. At the current moment, it would cost millions to attack the 
chain, and by the time the attacking party would be able to commit one double-spend or 
reorganize a block, the currency would not only be devalued, but the chain would be forked by 
the community to undo the damage. 2 Also, considering that the last checkpoint (irreversibility 
and hard coded blocks) was in 2014, the genesis block is unalterable. Unless you attack and 
destroy every last node, Nakamoto’s message is uncensorable.  
 
Figure 1: Bitcoin's Genesis Transaction 
 A large part of the security of the network comes from Bitcoin’s current hashrate, which 
is well over 50 exahash per second.3 This is the measurable amount of energy being utilized on 
the Bitcoin network at this time. This rate was originally broken in January of 2016 just as the 
market was turning around for Bitcoin during its multi-year slump. Interest began peaking and 
                                               
2 Louis, J. “Cost of a 51% Attack - GoBitcoin.” GoBitcoin.io, 2018, gobitcoin.io/tools/cost-51-attack/.  
3 “Bitcoin Hashrate Chart.” BitInfoCharts, 2018, bitinfocharts.com/comparison/bitcoin-hashrate.html. 
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running as the profitability of mining became much clearer to multiple operations, and eventually 
over time, the mining pools began diversifying as well. The reason why Bitcoin has become a 
system of delegation to pools rather than individual mining is because it has become more 
profitable to do so. If a pool of hashpower has a greater chance at block discovery and solving a 
proof of work collectively for a reward, it would make sense to join that pool and receive a 
portion of the block reward for one’s contributed hashrate.  
The current hashrate distribution has around seven mining pools controlling 80% of the 
hashrate.4 This doesn’t mean that the pool operators assume full control over the network, 
because any mining operation delegating hashpower to that pool can switch the pool they 
delegate to at any time. The numbers that the pools control are simply an aggregate of all the 
hashpower under them, further distributed by hundreds of mining operations. These operations 
are geographically agnostic, as an American mining operation can delegate their hashpower to a 
Chinese mining pool. This is especially important when it comes to control of the network, as 
miners choose which ruleset they mine on. As it may be more lucrative to choose one pool over 
the other, ethics play a large part in which pool to follow - further strengthening the individual 
incentive to keep the network as secure as possible.  
Miners in Bitcoin are also incentivized not to deviate from the network as well due to 
their usage of ASICs. ASICs, or an application-specific integrated circuit is a device that produce 
greater amounts of hashpower than a traditional computer can to mine on the network. As 
networks become more profitable to mine and hashpower becomes an arms race (much to the 
benefit of the security of the network), ASICs are typically constructed to provide the most 
efficient form of mining (figure 2). The importance of ASICs doesn’t only come from the 
                                               
4 “Hashrate Distribution.” Blockchain.com, 2018, www.blockchain.com/en/pools. 
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hashpower they provide, but the consensus they drive in terms of the direction of the chain. They 
not only allow the network to grow in an exponential scale (once implemented), but 
manufacturers of ASICs have the tendency to view hard forks, or upgrades to the network that 
are incompatible with existing rules, as hostile due to the potential for them to ‘brick’ or render 
the ASICs unusable (Neural Capital, 2018). This also makes purchasers of ASICs more likely to 
be aware of all economic outcomes of any network changes, including full-node demands as 
well.  
 
 
Figure 2: Current Bitcoin Hashrate Growth 
 User control comes in the form of running a fully validating node. In the Bitcoin network, 
the only way for transactions to propagate is by first broadcasting it to the eight nodes that one is 
connected to. If this transaction is invalid, it will never reach the first step towards multi-pronged 
propagation due to a rejection by connected peers (StopandDecrypt, 2018). These peers treat data 
equally, but if the transaction sent doesn’t abide by the ruleset outlined in the software, it will 
never even have chance at being included in a block by the miners, as it will never propagate to 
begin with. The full nodes, or rather the users of Bitcoin, act as the first line of defense even 
before it hits the current mining pools bundling transactions into blocks. This is why it’s 
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important for Bitcoin to maintain its current low-requirements and low blocksize to run a full-
node. The more users able to run a fully validating node, the more trustless and censorship 
resistant the chain from both a peer standpoint, and a miner standpoint. Running a “light node” 
or a client that connects one to a node doesn’t allow for the user to participate in the same 
consensus structure as running a full node. The game only exists between the nodes and miners 
falling in line on a larger distributed plane.  
 Related to both hashrate and user choice was the “SegWit2x” upgrade proposed back in 
2017 by a number of mining pools and companies dealing with Bitcoin. This upgrade looked to 
increase the blocksize of Bitcoin from 1MB to 2MB, and implement something known as 
“segregated witness,” which also dealt directly with scaling the chain (Lerner, 2017). The social 
coordinator of the upgrade, Barry Silbert of Digital Currency Group, gathered the executives and 
operators at a popular yearly conference in New York, and eventually this became known as 
‘The New York Agreement’.5 However, over time, support for the upgrade began waning as 
many node operators, the backbone of Bitcoin, signaled against the proposed upgrade to 2MB. 
This was due to less individuals potentially being able to run a full node, while posing a 
centralization risk in the form of validation. If users couldn’t run full nodes, businesses and state 
agents would be the only entities propagating transactions. Eventually, several mining pools 
began dropping off the agreement as the consensus against it grew. In the end, a centralization 
gambit failed to “upgrade” the chain due to the user-base of Bitcoin signaling against the 
changes, rendering them economically unfavorable to implement. The last major figures in the 
agreement ended up dropping in November, near the time of the upgrade’s deployment (Belshe, 
2017).  
                                               
5 Digital Currency Group. “Bitcoin Scaling Agreement at Consensus 2017.” Medium.com, Medium, 23 May 2017,    
medium.com/@DCGco/bitcoin-scaling-agreement-at-consensus-2017-133521fe9a77. 
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 Governance has two major types in blockchain protocols - on-chain and off-chain. In the 
case of Bitcoin, it’s off-chain, where a game of signaling occurs, as miners and full nodes have to 
both agree to which chain is valid and should receive the majority of the hashpower based on 
economic and social incentives. Miners choose which history to follow through hashrate, 
developers exercise whatever influence they can in the form of known ability, and nodes as the 
stakeholders are able to signal toward the validity of the software (Berg, 2018). Social consensus 
becomes very important in determining the future of the chain, and Bitcoin’s lack of a known 
founder and central development company or team renders it safe from extreme forms of 
influence. The more disparate and decentralized the parties are that are involved in all three arms 
of the ecosystem, the safer the ecosystem. Although the chain suffers from issues of speed when 
thought of as a “digital cash” system, the security guarantees remain in place which are of the 
greatest importance when dealing with censorship resistance.  
 Upgrading bitcoin consists of generating new ideas, and is a multi-step process where the 
ideas are rigorously tested, and potentially implemented by both the nodes and miners. In Pierre 
Rochard’s Bitcoin Governance, he outlines the process by which new proposals are eventually 
accepted as new rules for the chain either through soft forks which are compatible with existing 
rulesets, or hard forks which require completely new rulesets and are a bit more extreme. Simply 
put, upgrades to Bitcoin are verification rules that potentially come with other tradeoffs 
(Rochard, 2018). The process starts with research into the upgrade with an eventual proposal 
through the “BIP” system, or Bitcoin Improvement Proposal. First, shared proposals enter the 
social realm, hence the importance of the ‘wetter’ aspects of Bitcoin, and then the deployed 
software contains tested implementations of these proposals. This then creates a new 
coordination game between light node hosts, exchanges, and general full nodes (Rochard, 2018). 
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The actual enforcement comes from the adoption of the software upgrade and the hashpower 
behind the validation.  
The two types of potential upgrades come in the form of soft forks and hard forks. Soft 
forks simply require nodes to signal the upgrade when verifying the chain as the rules are still 
compatible with pre-existing rules. For example, moving the blocksize from 1MB to 0.5MB is 
compatible with the existing rule set, but an upgrade to 2MB is not. Like the 2MB upgrade, hard 
forks are completely incompatible with previous rules - if the coordination of such an upgrade 
doesn’t go as planned, it’s much easier to have a scenario in which the chain splits due to nodes 
still pointing to the legacy software and miners still mining the legacy chain. In this case, it’s 
typically hashrate and economic incentive that either picks a winning chain or allows them both 
to live, which led to the creation of Bitcoin Cash. Bitcoin Cash came at the result of a hard fork 
that upgraded the blocksize from 1MB to 8MB due to a large mining pool’s decision to support 
the changes. Since Bitcoin Cash was able to have a portion of the full nodes point to its software 
and a small chunk of hashpower and economic interest to support it, it still exists today alongside 
legacy Bitcoin which didn’t adopt the ruleset changes.   
Bitcoin’s system of ‘ungovernance’ has rendered it effective in distributing consensus in 
regard to upgrading the chain, but has rendered the collective action problem at bit more difficult 
to solve. However, it’s with this distribution and difficulty to upgrade that has given the protocol 
more strength over time. On the topic of governing the chain, developer Matt Corallo argues 
from a deontological standpoint in which any upgrade that compromises trustlessness only leads 
to dangerous outcomes to the chain (Rochard, 2018). In his view, Bitcoin is either a trustless 
form of digital cash, or a trustless form of digital gold (Corallo, 2017). It’s possible to solve the 
collective action problem of users figuring out which upgrade path is best, but requires social 
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consensus falling in line with a base degree of trustlesness. There is a keen awareness of why 
Bitcoin is dealing with scalability issues, but this view of trustlessness is what keeps central 
authorities away from potentially hampering with the censorship resistant properties of the chain.  
 On the other side of the debate in a more consequentialist view, Daniel Krawisz in his 
Who Controls Bitcoin article from a few years beforehand felt as though a market decision would 
play into whether or not trustlessness truly mattered for the protocol (Krawisz, 2015). In this 
case, markets and social adoption could promote a version of Bitcoin with compromised 
trustlessness. However, it wouldn’t hold the same inherent censorship resistant properties that 
makes Bitcoin what it is if a state actor were to breach the consensus in some shape or form. This 
standpoint held that Bitcoin “as an investment” was the base case for adoption, and that a 
particular philosophy of ethics (trustlessness) surrounding the base protocol would reach a halt if 
it meant widespread adoption (Krawisz, 2015). Krawisz has gone on to support the Bitcoin Cash 
fork of the protocol, in which larger blocks allow for greater transaction speeds at the cost of a 
wider base of users being able to run their own nodes.   
 Bitcoin wasn’t designed to hold vast amounts of data, and is quite difficult to embed large 
amounts of information on. It was meant to hold transactional data referencing who sent coins to 
the party of their choosing. In the case of Bitcoin, there are two types of transaction outputs - the 
first being the typical unspent transaction output (UTXO), and the second being OP_RETURN. 
In the case of the UTXO, these are the spendable outputs that the recipient can then forward to 
the next party of their choosing. Individuals that originally sent transactions to “vanity 
addresses,” which were Bitcoin addresses that contained a word or a name were ‘blockchain 
bloaters’ in that these sent bitcoin could not be spent after being sent (Langiewicz, 2014). So by 
sending to a vanity address, bitcoin were essentially destroyed, and these transactions bloated all 
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of the clients. However, Bitcoin 0.9 introduced OP_RETURN which was a transaction locking 
script that allowed the storage of a small amount of data. 
 The more ambitious type of user did in fact encode data into multiple transactions, 
unfortunately causing bloat. However, sometimes the message could in fact be positive, as was a 
Nelson Mandela tribute from 2013 that included many of his quote across a series of UTXOs.6 
OP_RETURN was a deployed as a way to store up to 80 bytes in a transaction, and eventually 
was reduced to 40.7 Essentially, this addition became the compromise on adding data payloads to 
transactions, as having this data payload can open the door for more programmable forms of 
value, as well as the ability to write messages to the chain as many users have done so in the 
past. Eventually pruning this type of script can cause less bloat rather than simply creating burn 
transactions to vanity addresses with messages. Bitcoin with OP_RETURN can act in a way as a 
messaging protocol as well as a permissionless digital value transfer system.  
 Not every blockchain benefits from the same degree of limited attack-surface that Bitcoin 
has. For example, EOS, another popular blockchain protocol uses something known as 
“delegated proof of stake” to add blocks of transactions to the ledger. Delegated proof of stake 
(DPoS) was originally proposed in 2013 by Daniel Larimer for his Bitshares blockchain, and 
votes from the network control its fixed validator set (a group of elected officials that have the 
power to validate transactions). A liquid democracy system holds this vote to elect validators that 
sign and validate blocks (Larimer, 2013). The centralization tradeoff by having a fixed amount of 
                                               
6 Shrriff, Ken. “Hidden Surprises in the Bitcoin Blockchain and How They Are Stored: Nelson Mandela, Wikileaks.    
Photos, and Python Software.” Ken Shrriff's Blog, 2014, www.righto.com/2014/02/ascii-bernanke-wikileaks-
photographs.html. 
7 “Core Development Update #5.” Bitcoin Foundation, 10 Mar. 2017, bitcoinfoundation.org/core-development-
update-5/. 
 
30 
witnesses validate transactions rather than Nakamoto consensus that adheres to the longest chain 
of work does in fact speed up transactional throughput, but comes at the cost of potential 
censorship at the hands of the validators.  
 Rather than a free-for-all that does in fact further decentralize the network, DPoS can be 
thought of as a “traditional organizational hierarchy” that is both transparent and fair to a degree 
(Samani, 2018). EOS holders elect 21 block producers in periods of continuous approval 
(Larimer, 2017). These producers are responsible for the network and must provide full network 
participation for continual consideration, as they are rewarded for their production. These 
rewards are typically granted to the token holders that cast their vote for the producers, in order 
to keep their support while the producer takes a larger percentage. While this does mean that the 
chain can achieve a higher throughput due to a small consensus set that’s democratically elected, 
it also poses a centralization and cartelization risk at the hands of the producers themselves, 
which has happened in other DPoS blockchains such as Lisk (Günther, 2018).  
 For example, what is to prevent a nation state from manipulating these block producers, 
as they are centrally known entities? In a traditional proof of work system or proof of stake 
system, individuals and pools can remain pseudonymous and continually add hashpower to the 
network. If an individual wished to use the network for something that a particular nation state 
deems illicit, or participate in a non-sanctioned decentralized application running on EOS, the 
block producers that are signing the transactions hold the liability. For example, an online 
decentralized encyclopedia may be faster when built on EOS, but doesn’t have the same 
immutability guarantees as something with a larger attack-surface such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. 
EOS has already had problems of freezing accounts by block producers back in June of 2018, at 
which time they held a conference call - another centralization risk (Floyd, 2018). However, 
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EOS’ platform grade censorship resistance was truly tested in July of 2018, when an application 
recreating The War of Attrition was built on Ethereum rather than EOS for that very reason.  
 During the Summer of 2018, a website called “exitscam.me” hosted a project called 
“FOMO3D,” which recreated The War of Attrition in which participants would bid on a 
particular reward and the second-place bidder has to pay as well. The game ends up driving into 
an “ego driven disaster,” as participants continually bid up the price of the reward even after the 
bids exceed its net value (Stephenson, 2018). Because the game resembles that of a Ponzi 
scheme, and pays dividends to a particular extent to participants that “buy keys”, the developers 
shied away from using EOS. The avoidance was due to the potential scenario in which the block 
producers censor the contract. Potential fraud or not, censorship resistance must act as a binary 
rather than a spectrum manner at the hands of potential cartels in EOS. This is why the creators 
of the game produced it on Ethereum - a safer bet in this case. However, as decentralized as 
Ethereum is, there are some social risks that are faced by it as well that could potentially hinder 
its ability to be censorship resistant.  
 Ethereum, which currently trails right behind Bitcoin in hashpower and full nodes was 
originally proposed in 2013 by Vitalik Buterin as a means to build decentralized applications and 
have a virtual machine on top of a public blockchain (Buterin, 2013). Tokenization options and 
programmability were both limited at the time on Bitcoin, and the community agreed with the 
idea that value can be programmed. As the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) is turing complete, 
it can handle calculations with the assumption that memory is available and provided by the 
network to do so. In this case, Ether, Ethereum’s native cryptocurrency became a form of “gas” 
to power the network. Ethereum’s drive to be a form of programmable money came heavily from 
Nick Szabo’s writing on smart contracts in 1994.  
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 To Szabo, a smart contract must satisfy contractual conditions, minimize exceptions, and 
get rid of intermediaries (Szabo, 1994). In the case of Ethereum, programmed smart contracts 
can handle logic cycles for applications, tokenization, and autonomously handle various forms of 
escrow. Once written to the network, any action taken to interact with that contract in its 
programmed way will execute the functions that it contains. This is similar to the ways in which 
one would interact with a vending machine: the preferred item is selected (the process of 
selecting the contract), currency is inserted (digital asset sent to the contract), and the item vends 
(the contract executes). Szabo created a glossary of terms just one year later in order to outline 
the various types of functions and asset types that can interact with said contracts (Szabo, 1995).  
 The reason for Ethereum’s vulnerability mostly comes from the standpoint of a social 
attack. Ethereum has a centralized set of authority figures, namely an identified founder, a swiss 
foundation, and a core development team. Although Bitcoin similarly has a few core developers 
that contribute a majority of the code, the founder, Satoshi Nakamoto, remains anonymous 
throughout Bitcoin’s history, preventing any form of social manipulation of the direction from a 
centralized point of authority. As governance of particular chains becomes a coordination game 
of flag following, even if inadvertent, it’s important that social consensus on public chain 
decisions be a natural process. The ugly side of this centralization risk manifested during 2016, 
when a project known as TheDAO forever marred Ethereum.  
 TheDAO’s white paper was initially released in 2016 to create a form of decentralized 
venture capital fund on the Ethereum blockchain with a governance mechanism (Jentzsch, 2016). 
This would then in-turn give more control to the investors that participated in the sale, and 
encode all the rules associated with transacting. However, after raising over $150 million, an 
individual was able to exploit the code and begin draining that money directly from the 
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application. In this case, it was a recursive call exploit in which the hacker was able to take back 
their ether from the contract (exiting TheDAO), and continue to call that function repeatedly for 
as long as possible. Because calling funds back had a waiting period, the community began 
coordinating on figuring out a plan on what to do.   
 The originally proposed solution by the community was a soft fork of the codebase which 
would blacklist all transactions made from TheDAO’s smart contract.8 However, critical 
vulnerabilities were found in the code and the fix was immediately thrown away. After that, and 
after much social deliberation between key figures in the community, the foundation announced 
a vote on July 15th in order to have users decide on whether or not there should be a bailout 
(Wilcke, 2016). The vote would be held through a tool called “carbonvote,” which would allow 
users to signal on their preferred option and the weight of their decision would be counted based 
on the amount of Ethereum they held, rendering it pseudo-plutocratic.  
 Along with this came the fact that a massive percentage of locked Ether was in TheDAO, 
not letting those users vote - as it required exiting TheDAO along with the lockup window. The 
Ethereum Foundation, responsible for the initial sale and management of Ethereum’s treasury 
still held a massive sway of both funds and influence which reflected in the vote (albeit along 
with some general turnout issues). During the carbonvote, the participation rate was below 10%, 
with one voter being a quarter of the entire representation (Buterin, 2017). Ethereum successfully 
forked to bail out the community, but not without a minority group of individuals forking the 
chain into what’s now known as Ethereum Classic in which history was never changed. This 
                                               
8 Buterin, Vitalik. “CRITICAL UPDATE Re: DAO Vulnerability.” Ethereum Blog, The Ethereum Foundation, 17 
June 2016, blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability/. 
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situation brought censorship resistance (the censoring of the individual exploiting the contract) 
and immutability (the history of the chain) into question for Ethereum.  
 Along with this risk came the regulatory talk of Ethereum being a security (investment 
contract), considering that the majority of the supply was sold and issued from a central party to 
those that contributed to a sale. Bitcoin by its nature was never an investment contract, as a 
genesis block was launched and announced for anyone to contribute to the network on the day of 
its inception. However, this sale led to years of legal questioning and regulatory scrutiny in the 
United States until 2018 when William Hinman, the Director of the Division of Corporate 
Finance for the SEC tried to pin down the meaning of “sufficient decentralization” for Ethereum 
to avoid the label of a security by regulators (Hinman, 2018). The necessity to have this 
conversation, regardless of the network’s status, leaves a larger regulatory risk in the broader 
financial world on Ethereum as compared to Bitcoin. Regulators attempting to determine 
“sufficient decentralization” also becomes a greater threat to the ecosystem at large, as it 
attempts to place a dire spectrum in a sandbox of uninformed participants.  
4. Censorship Resistance Through Blockchains 
 A blockchain provided the #MeToo-based protest in China with something the 
government couldn’t censor at-will. It was also something that was self-policed in its own way in 
the form of network health rather than social censorship. There was no choke-point for the ledger 
itself, as the only throttled measures could’ve been through third-party providers. The cost of 
carrying out the attack would not only be through gathering enough energy, but swaying social 
consensus as well to attempt to remove the transaction. The government met its match at that 
moment in time.  
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 The transaction placed on the Ethereum blockchain containing the letter seems to show 
that the creator initiated this address for the sake of this event. The input that gave the address 
Ether in order to create the transaction to put the letter on-chain came within the same hour from 
an address with just a handful of outputs. The input on that address came from an address with 
over 22,000 transactions, 100 days before the send to the address that wrote the letter to the chain 
(figure 3). This “origin” wallet is only one year old as well, with plenty of input transactions 
from a plethora of different sources. This level of obfuscation helps protect the individual that 
made the transaction, as multiple layers of mixing can divert attempts to audit histories through 
third-party on-ramps (exchanges, anything requiring KYC, or anything leaving a paper trail).   
 
Figure 3: Transaction History of Wallet in Question 
The actual transaction occurred on April 23rd, 2018 at 07:02:20AM UTC. It took place at block 
height 5,490,403, and has since had hundreds of thousands of block confirmations from blocks in 
the chain placed after that one.9 The amount transacted to the address was zero, but the gas to 
                                               
9 Etherscan, 2018, etherscan.io/tx/0x2d6a7b0f6adeff38423d4c62cd8b6ccb708ddad85da5d3d06756ad4d8a04a6a2. 
36 
actually send the transaction only cost $0.53 at the time. Miners and nodes accepted the 
transaction as any other transaction on the chain: without bias and without any forms of 
rejections. The miners saw an opportunity to bundle this transaction along with the gas paid in 
the block, and did so because of the economics of keeping the system flowing for the sake of 
profitability. The hash of the transaction keeps it auditable on block explorers such as etherscan, 
that also give outside observers the input included as well.  
 Block explorers such as etherscan allow users to convert the data included as UTF-8 to 
make the letter readable. Although block explorers add a layer of convenience, they can be 
censorable by state actors. However, simply running a full node instead of going through a third 
party service can bring up the transaction to view the data payload as well. The converted data 
shows the letter by Xin being included in both in English and Chinese. One transaction contained 
both translated versions, and there was room for a bit more data if needed. This was the most 
direct way of putting the actual information on-chain, and the individual that placed it on the 
chain most likely knew that these services would allow easy viewing of the materials.  
Shortly after, the Chinese government responded by censoring that particular transaction 
URL on etherscan. The entire etherscan website was still available for anyone to view, but users 
on China’s popular WeChat messenger were unable to access that particular page due to the fact 
that it became “non-compliant content” (Zhao, 2018). The letter originally circulated on WeChat, 
before being censored by the government. However, regardless of this level of censorship, as 
mentioned earlier, individuals could still run a full-node on their own computers through 
whatever proxy they need in order to do so, and view the transaction directly on the blockchain. 
Although it adds a layer of friction due to it being unable to provide the same ‘service’ as 
something like a block explorer can (conversion to UTF-8, simple URL sends), the transaction is 
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still available on every copy of the universal ledger. In an effort to avoid any form of transaction 
linking potentially to Yue Xin herself, the owner of the wallet sent another self-transaction to 
clarify their identity and positioning: 
 
1. I'm not Yue Xin or her friend. I just want to save a copy of her letter on blockchain. To 
show one of the possible usage of blockchain.  
2. I'm not the participant of the event in PKU. I don't need donation. Please don't send 
eth or other tokens. If you want to support them, please try to contact them directly. 
3. Be careful with spam.10 
 
 As an added layer to the act of putting it on the chain, replies started pouring in both on 
etherscan and on-chain. The most interacted-with comment on etherscan is a picture of the 
protest posters at Peking University, while other comments include images of statements 
regarding the importance of the truth. Also included are comments explaining how to convert the 
data to UTF-8 to those that may not be familiar with the technology. Some individuals that were 
aware of the potential for censored etherscan comments decided to take their own responses to 
the blockchain. Just twelve hours later, a transaction from a different address to the ‘protest 
address’, included a message in the same way as the letter. Once converted to UTF-8, the 
comment reads as follows:  
Disappointed by the official statement of Peking University,  
hope PKU will not stand on the wrong side of this issue.  
Keep strong! --Anonymous, in Tsinghua University.11 
 
                                               
10 Etherscan, 2018, etherscan.io/tx/0x93c0894a4f9d82f5426323e8e44f567653411824a5e9615b6ba3b6bfe70d63df.  
11 Etherscan, 2018, etherscan.io/tx/0x548f15260c1f67af26cff021d993f600256c75e34b619f6b86e8a724d20bb097.  
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Figure 4: Transactional Messaging 
  
 This kind of message through transaction adds a new dynamic to using a blockchain for 
censorship resistance: public protests and transparent communications that are in direct defiance 
of a nation state (figure 4). The address that sent the response through a transaction on-chain 
rather than a comment on etherscan deployed the same tactics to circumvent the state and make 
sure their reply and support would be forever embedded on-chain. Because the chain logs time 
and has an ordering mechanism, the flow of information can remain intact. Other participants in 
this newly formed ‘conversation’ can deploy the same methods that the protest address used for 
extra protection. The Chinese government was able to take down the etherscan page containing 
that transaction quite easily, but to take down the conversation occurring now on-chain, they 
would have to set their sights on the entire Ethereum blockchain. The importance of the 
comment mentioned in particular is that it’s an individual signing from another university in 
China in a form of solidarity even beyond Peking; an establishment that the protest on Peking 
goes beyond a single point in the country’s university system. Now the response has been 
recorded in the history of the chain as well, forever to remain there so long as the blockchain 
continues to run and operate through its various mining pools and full nodes.  
 With Bitcoin’s 40 byte limit, Ethereum became the more viable option to store the entire 
letter on, as its fees are variable depending on how much one wishes to store on the blockchain 
in a data payload. To store a 256 bit word, it takes 20,000 gas - the “fuel” for the Ethereum 
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network that the miners take as a cut for processing the transactions (Wood, 2014). The current 
gas price on the Ethereum network is around $0.009 per 20,000 gas with a slow transaction 
time.12 Based on this information, to store a small message on the chain is relatively cheap, 
which is why it was easy to store the entire letter. The message that followed afterward in a 
support context contained less information, and was cheaper. Storing the message on Ethereum 
was quite powerful, but in order to store it on Bitcoin, the security guarantees of the network 
require a shortened message. Ethereum works as a storage place that’s harder to attack than 
conventional centralized services, but removing something from Bitcoin is much more costlier in 
terms of both a capital and social scale.  
 Storing on the Bitcoin network, although won’t provide the same length options as easily 
as Ethereum, will make a message even more resistant to centralized parties. There are three 
varying ways in which the bitcoin blockchain can store the message. The first would come in the 
form of a shortened message - in this case, taking the letter and condensing the absolute message 
to fit in a 40 byte format, as that is the limit of the OP_RETURN function in a transaction. In this 
case, coins go unburnt, and the message would exist in a transaction in the form of a data 
payload. However, the problem with this method is providing an objective way of simplifying 
and accurately demonstrating the pith of a particular message. Although Bitcoin has the highest 
security guarantees, condensed messages are the only way to prevent bloat on the chain. 
Otherwise, there’s the case of a difficult chain to access as a full-archival node, such as 
Ethereum.   
The second would come in the form of a multi-output format to fake addresses, which 
ends up burning coins, or writing a lot to the chain in multiple transactions using OP_RETURN 
                                               
12 ETH Gas Station, 2018, ethgasstation.info/calculatorTxV.php. 
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and is a complete burden on the network. In the case of a multi-output format to fake addresses, 
the addresses being sent Bitcoin are fake because they’re based on values already stored on the 
chain. For example in the case of someone storing data on Nelson Mandela on the chain, one 
individual used a small amount of bitcoin sent across over a dozen fake addresses (each having a 
hexadecimal or hex value on the chain of the custom text) in order to store their message on-
chain.13 They found the correct hex for their message (converting text to hex), found a 
corresponding address to forge based on that hex and sent the transaction across all the 
addresses. In the other case, it would be the case of generating real transactions but having an 
OP_RETURN for each transaction with a small sliver in the message. The transactions would 
then follow the same ordering as the message.  
The third way to achieve this would be storing a hash of the message as a redundancy 
measure in conjunction with something like Ethereum. In this case, the hash stored on Bitcoin 
would link to the Ethereum transaction containing the message, simply as a linkability measure. 
For example, a hash on Bitcoin would confirm and authenticate the message and payload 
contained on Ethereum. In this case, Bitcoin would simply act as a notary to the transaction. 
However, this still uses Ethereum as the base anchor, and could be best served through 
referencing on Ethereum itself. The reference on Ethereum will be included for the sake of 
rebroadcasting of the letter’s current state, as well as a writing of the condensed version of the 
artifact onto Ethereum. 
 With Bitcoin’s 40 byte limit, condensing the message will be the first difficult part of the 
excursion, as it becomes a completely subjective measure. The genesis block of Bitcoin explored 
                                               
13
 Bitcoin Transaction, Blockchain.com, 2018, 
www.blockchain.com/btc/tx/8881a937a437ff6ce83be3a89d77ea88ee12315f37f7ef0dd3742c30eef92dba?show_adv
=true. 
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the original form of an idea being condensed for the sake of leaving a message on the chain. 
Satoshi Nakamoto left the headline of the newspaper both as a timestamp of the day of the 
genesis block’s creation, and to leave a story on the chain that represented the reasoning for the 
creation of the chain. The government bailed out the banks and central parties involved even 
though they were wrong for committing financial fraud, so bitcoin became the sovereign money 
to respond to the events. However, taking what Satoshi left as a framework for how to store 
content on the chain might help the condensing of the message in an objective format. To 
remove oneself as a source of bias in this condensing would be completely impossible as I am 
determining which artifact to leave on the chain as a representation. But to minimize bias, I 
administered a similar methodology to what Nakamoto used. 
 In an effort to keep the event of both Yue Xin’s message being posted as well as the 
circumventing of censors alive, Bloomberg’s “Chinese #MeToo Student Activists Use 
Blockchain to Fight Censors” captures that message. Its reference to the students as “#MeToo 
Student Activists” signal their support for ending sexual violence, the “#MeToo movement” 
which has become metonymy for the movement, and the blockchain aspect to call attention to 
the circumventing of a nation state’s censorship practices. The article both captures Yue Xin’s 
plight and demands for releasing documents, as well as the university’s subsequent intimidation 
and “muzzling” of her (Zhai, 2018). The article references the “stamping” of the article onto the 
Ethereum chain, as well as a few subtle calls to alert the masses of this methodology. Also 
included is the note about the fact that you can’t “404” a blockchain, in reference to the ways in 
which the Chinese government take down websites from the public view.  
 The first step to place this message on-chain, is converting it to hex. Without any form of 
online conversion, one can convert the text string to ASCII (a traditional encoding standard) 
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manually, and then that ASCII to hexadecimal values. The chain can store these hexadecimal 
values. However, there are plenty of tools to achieve this, all of which are accessible to even the 
most basic of internet users. The three steps to have a proper hex for the data payload include 
first converting the string to hex, removing all spaces, and capitalizing all letters to condense the 
hex. In this case, Chinese #MeToo Student Activists Use Blockchain to Fight Censors becomes 
the following hex:  
 
4368696E65736520234D65546F6F205374756 
4656E742041637469766973747320557365204 
26C6F636B636861696E20746F2046696768742 
043656E736F7273. 
 
To send everything to the Bitcoin blockchain, the first client-side item to address is downloading 
the latest version of a full-node software and syncing the chain to ensure one is sending and 
verifying their own transaction. The software as of late 2018 has still not exceeded 200GB when 
fully synced, still leaving an accessible way for most individuals to run a full node for the sake of 
embedding data on the chain. Once the chain has been synced to a local device, a new address 
must be generated and at least one transaction has to be sent. After including the text in a 
transaction and spending and signing, the transaction with the message should now be on-chain 
(figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Bitcoin Core Software 
 
 All bitcoin nodes syncing the chain should now be hosting the transaction after executing 
it. Block explorers that can convert hex to text can display the transaction, and any node that has 
a history of the chain can pull up the transaction. To look up the transaction, someone simply has 
to pull up the transaction ID 
(733f12bcbec1c05431c79d6ca4af67e8ab748adbeeea7e5e33aafdcc0e8863b1). Included in the 
scripts of the transaction is the message. In the case of using third party providers, this can be in 
the form of any block explorer that provides a similar service to Etherscan in Ethereum’s case. 
For example, pressing the “Show scripts & coinbase” button on a transaction on popular Bitcoin 
block explorer blockchain.info will show both the hex, and the converted text for anyone to view 
the message. As with the case of China censoring the Etherscan page, they can still censor any 
block explorer. Full nodes that have a history of the blockchain can still pull up the transaction 
and view the hex directly from their software, which they can then subsequently convert to text.  
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 One of the major attack vectors on this method comes from a nation state banning bitcoin 
in the country. If one can’t acquire bitcoin in the country, it may be tougher to actually write the 
message to the chain considering that the script has to be a part of a transaction. However, China 
banned Ethereum, and the protesters still managed to both acquire the cryptocurrency and write 
the message to the chain. The only angle a nation state can take with banning cryptocurrency 
comes from third party gateways to buy and sell it. However, they can’t ban its transfer unless 
they took down the entire network, a task that is quite costly. As long as the Ether or Bitcoin is 
sent from a peer or mined directly, there is no way that a nation state can throttle its acquisition.  
 For those that can’t write to the chain from a full-node, there are alternative services that 
will provide the action of writing a data payload to a transaction for a fee. For example, one 
service called Eternity Wall (eternitywall.it) provides both notary services and OP_RETURN 
services to anyone that wishes to use it. It’s a third party provider which is censorable, but the 
provider creates an accessibility point for individuals in countries that may not have as-harsh 
censorship. The Eternity Wall service provides a moving list of all written messages that used its 
service, and the service fee for it is only 0.0008 BTC which currently equates to $5 USD. It’s a 
bit costlier than running your own node, but eases a layer of friction for those who aren’t as 
savvy. Other services such as cryptograffiti.info service other chains in the same way, such as 
Bitcoin Cash which is cheaper but doesn’t have the same security guarantees.  
Writing the new condensed message on Ethereum is also as simple as including a data 
payload. However, the actual transaction requires a significantly lower amount of cost on the 
network. In this case, I used the same hex but now in the data payload field using an online 
wallet such as MyEtherWallet - a basic connection to another service’s full-node. Considering 
the availability of full nodes on the Ethereum network, the individuals that placed Yue Xin’s 
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message on the chain may have used a third party wallet in order to connect to one. China does 
not have myetherwallet.com blocked as of yet, so users can still include data on transactions by 
using their wallet service. However, if China were to block the domain, users would have to take 
the same route as the bitcoin transaction by syncing a full node. 
 
Figure 6: Etherscan View of Transaction 
Finally, a hash can now be placed on the bitcoin blockchain in reference to that Ethereum 
transaction as a form of notary. In this case, the OP_RETURN of a bitcoin transaction references 
the transaction hash of the Ethereum transaction 
(0x93387746c5722b9be7bf8f7bdf3af913fdb2592d310c0e0b92f929a755dd4f37). Also included 
will be “ETH TXN” to designate that this transaction hash is pointing to a transaction on the 
Ethereum blockchain. The hex for this message is as follows: 
 
4554482054584e20307839333338373734366335 
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37323262396265376266386637626466336166 
39313366646323539326433313063306530623932 
6639323961373535646434663337 
 
Once added to the bitcoin blockchain, there is now a reference on the bitcoin blockchain 
confirming the existence of the Ethereum transaction. The transaction ID for the bitcoin 
transaction is 98846ff0939e1f5e812194e41b5405022d00d93634a637c247f33edb91007026 and 
the OP_RETURN message can be read through any third party service or with a bitcoin full 
node. In this scenario, third party Ethereum block explorers are down, but full nodes can gather 
the information by using this OP_RETURN’s contained reference (figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: Bitcoin OP_Return 
5. Conclusion 
 
 Blockchains present a secure option to store data because of the financial incentive to 
protect them and that thousands of computers keep copies for verification and redundancy. 
They’re costly but prevent an alternative option to centralized services that a government can 
easily censor. Rather than a centralized service receiving an order to take down a particular post 
or message, the government can’t send a message to a particular company in control of a chain 
because there aren’t any. Social risks come with public blockchains, but Bitcoin and Ethereum 
have proven to be resistant to any long-tail risk in that regard. The Chinese government also has 
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mixed incentives due to the nature of the system being both the driver of new markets, but also 
the host to data they deem illicit. Ethereum’s blockchain was an excellent option to store Yue 
Xin’s letter, and Bitcoin also provides a secure alternative.  
 The Chinese government was able to step in and censor Yue Xin’s letter on WeChat, and 
even went so far as to censor the transaction’s page on Etherscan. WeChat’s censorship came 
simply through self-policing or through a direct order from the government, while Ethereum’s 
censorship would come at a great financial cost. However, the transaction still exists on the 
Ethereum blockchain and is viewable through any uncensored block explorer, or anyone running 
the a full node that can ping the transaction. All the subsequent messages sent to the address 
through Ethereum’s blockchain are also visible to anyone with the same infrastructure. 
Communication protocols using Ethereum’s infrastructure are also starting to appear which may 
both expedite the process generation and user adoption of uncensorable messages and 
conversations.  
  Blockchains won’t just present these complicated barriers for strict nation states, but for 
all governments seeking to censor information as well. Public blockchains are global, and 
accessible to anyone with an internet connection and computer. The cost incurred by one 
government remains static across all governments in the case of attacking a public blockchain. 
Governments are now competing both with each other in terms of information, and directly with 
private interests that favor a financial asset over social control. They present a unique tool for the 
preservation of information and the entry and exit costs are low. These low costs come from both 
being able to preserve information across different blockchains, but having social consensus 
agree on a history away from the government’s manipulation in the case of forking the code after 
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an attack. Public blockchains are not just a financial good that modify and democratize 
traditional finance, but information tools that have extremely large attack surfaces.   
Public blockchains may even face an increasingly pertinent role in western societies if 
nation states that were once loose on censorship rules become strict. For example, Australia 
recently passed a bill that would thwart encryption techniques in favor of building backdoors in 
most consumer technologies (Karp, 2018). Public blockchains have their own encryption 
techniques that can’t be modified unless the government convinces all users of the network to 
follow their own implementation unlike centrally controlled and developed devices. In the case 
of Yue Xin, a public blockchain was a cheap way to resist the censorship of the Chinese 
government that had base protections. Tomorrow it will be a journalist, next week it will be an 
activist, and next month the user experience will be even easier as more developers continue to 
work on them.  
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